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Abstract
Oblivious transfer is a fundamental primitive in cryptography. While perfect information
theoretic security is impossible, quantum oblivious transfer protocols can limit the dishonest
players’ cheating. Finding the optimal security parameters in such protocols is an important
open question. In this paper we show that every 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol allows
a dishonest party to cheat with probability bounded below by a constant strictly larger than
1/2. Alice’s cheating is defined as her probability of guessing Bob’s index, and Bob’s cheating
is defined as his probability of guessing both input bits of Alice. In our proof, we relate these
cheating probabilities to the cheating probabilities of a coin flipping protocol and conclude by
using Kitaev’s coin flipping lower bound. Then, we present an oblivious transfer protocol with
two messages and cheating probabilities at most 3/4. Last, we extend Kitaev’s semidefinite
programming formulation to more general primitives, where the security is against a dishonest
player trying to force the outcome of the other player, and prove optimal lower and upper bounds
for them.
Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2010.157
1 Introduction
Quantum information enables us to do cryptography with information theoretic security.
The first breakthrough result in quantum cryptography is the unconditionally secure key
distribution protocol of Bennett and Brassard [BB84]. Since then, a long series of work has
studied which other cryptographic primitives are possible in the quantum world. However,
the subsequent results were negative. Mayers and Lo, Chau proved the impossibility of
secure ideal quantum bit commitment and oblivious transfer and consequently of any type
of two-party secure computation [May97, LC97, DKSW07]. On the other hand, several
imperfect variants of these primitives have been shown to be possible. Finding the optimal
parameters for such fundamental primitives has been since an important open question. The
reason for looking at these abstract primitives is that they are the basis for all cryptographic
protocols one may wish to construct, including identification schemes, digital signatures,
electronic voting, etc. Let us emphasize that in this paper we only look at information
theoretic security and we do not discuss computational security or security in restricted
models like the bounded-storage or noisy-storage model.
We start with coin flipping, which was first proposed by Blum [Blu81] and has since found
numerous applications in two-party secure computation. Even though the results of Mayers
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and of Lo and Chau exclude the possibility of perfect quantum coin flipping, i.e., where
the resulting coin is perfectly unbiased, it still remained open whether one can construct
a quantum protocol where no player could bias the coin with probability 1. Aharonov et
al. [ATVY00] provided such a protocol where no dishonest player could bias the coin with
probability higher than 0.9143. Then, Ambainis [Amb01] described an improved protocol
whose cheating probability was at most 3/4. Subsequently, a number of different protocols
had been proposed [SR01, NS03, KN04] that achieved the same bound of 3/4.
On the other hand, Kitaev [Kit03], using a formulation of quantum coin flipping as
semidefinite programs proved a lower bound of 1/2 on the product of the cheating probabilities
for Alice and Bob (see [ABDR04]). In other words, no quantum coin flipping protocol can
achieve a cheating probability less than 1/
√
2 for both Alice and Bob.
The question of whether 3/4 or 1/
√
2 was the right answer has recently been resolved
by Chailloux and Kerenidis [CK09] who described a protocol with cheating probability
arbitrarily close to 1/
√
2. In their protocol they use as a subroutine a weaker variant of coin
flipping which is referred to as weak coin flipping.
In this paper, we focus on oblivious transfer, which is a universal primitive for any two-
party secure computation [Rab81, EGL82, Cré87]. We define a 1-out-of-2 random oblivious
transfer protocol with bias ε, denoted here as random-OT .
The first impossibility result for quantum OT with information theoretic security was
shown by Lo [Lo97]. However, not much was known about the best possible bias that one
can get for OT . Note that Kitaev’s lower bound does not a priori hold for OT , since we do
not know how to easily convert an OT protocol to a coin flipping protocol without any loss.
In related work, Salvail, Schaffner and Sotakova [SSS09] have quantitatively studied a
different notion of security for OT protocols (and generally any two-party protocols) that
they call information leakage. They prove, among other results, that any 1-out-of-2 OT
protocol has a constant leakage. Their model is somewhat different, for example they do not
allow the players to abort during the protocol, and their security notion is described in terms
of mutual information and entropy and does not immediately translate to our security notion
of guessing probabilities. However, their results provide more evidence that almost-perfect
OT protocols are impossible for different variants of security.
In another work, Jain, Radhakrishnan and Sen [JRS02] showed that in a 1-out-of-n OT
protocol, if Alice gets t bits of information about Bob’s index b, then Bob gets at least
Ω(n/2O(t)) bits of information about Alice’s string x.
Our work
In this paper, we quantitatively study the bias of quantum oblivious transfer protocols. More
precisely, we construct a coin flipping protocol that uses OT as a subroutine and show a
relation between the cheating probabilities of the OT protocol and the ones of the coin
flipping protocol. Then, using Kitaev’s lower bound for coin flipping we derive a non-trivial
lower bound (albeit weaker) on the cheating probabilities for OT . More precisely we prove
the following theorem.
I Theorem 1. In any quantum oblivious transfer protocol, we have
AOT · f(BOT ) ≥ 1/2
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where f is a function that we define later1. This implies for the bias ε of the protocol that
ε ≥ 12
(√
1
2 + 2
√
2−
√
1
2
)
− 12 ≈ 0.0586.
Moreover, in Section 4 we describe a simple 1-out-of-2 random-OT protocol and analyze
the cheating probabilities of Alice and Bob.
I Theorem 2. There exists a quantum oblivious transfer protocol such that AOT = BOT = 34 .
One may wonder if it would be possible to extend Kitaev’s semidefinite programming
formulation to include the OT primitive and get a stronger lower bound this way. In Section 5
we describe a generalization of Kitaev’s semidefinite program that captures a variant of the
general k-out-of-n OT primitive. Coin flipping, is then the special case of 1-out-of-1 OT .
However, there is a big difference. What the semidefinite program formulation captures is
the probability that one player can force the outcome of the other one. More precisely, we
define a k-out-of-n forcing oblivious transfer protocol, denoted here as
(
n
k
)
-fOT.
We show the following theorem.
I Theorem 3. In any
(
n
k
)
-fOT protocol and consistent b, x, xb we have
Bx ·Ab,xb ≥ Pr[Alice honestly outputs x and Bob honestly outputs (b, xb)] =
1(
n
k
)
2n
.
In particular, the forcing bias satisfies ε ≥ √2k.
Note that for the special case of coin flipping, or else
(1
1
)
-fOT, our bounds are tight (a
multiplicative bias of
√
2 is equivalent to a cheating probability of 1√2 ).
Similar to coin flipping, one can get optimal protocols as well for
(
n
k
)
-fOT.
I Theorem 4. Let γ > 0. There exists a protocol for
(
n
k
)
-fOT with cheating probabilities:
Ab,xb ≤
√
2k(1 + γ)(
n
k
) · 2k and Bx ≤
√
2k(1 + γ)
2n .
2 Preliminaries
In the literature, many different variants of oblivious transfer have been considered. In this
paper, we mainly consider random oblivious transfer. In the full version, we show how this
definition is equivalent to other definitions of oblivious transfer with respect to the bias ε.
I Definition 5 (Random Oblivious Transfer). A 1-out-of-2 quantum random oblivious transfer
protocol with bias ε, denoted here as random-OT , is a protocol between Alice and Bob such
that:
Alice outputs two bits (x0, x1) or Abort and Bob outputs two bits (b, y) or Abort
If Alice and Bob are honest, they never Abort, y = xb, Alice has no information about b
and Bob has no information about xb. Also, x0, x1, b are uniformly random bits
AOT := sup{Pr[Alice guesses b and Bob does not Abort]} = 12 + εA
BOT := sup{Pr[Bob guesses (x0, x1) and Alice does not Abort]} = 12 + εB
1 f is the inverse of the function g(x) = x(2x− 1)2 on some domain
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The bias of the protocol is defined as ε := max{εA, εB}
where the suprema are taken over all cheating strategies for Alice and Bob.
Note that this definition is slightly different from usual definitions because we want the
exact value of the cheating probabilities and not only an upper bound. This is because we
consider both lower bounds and upper bounds for OT protocols but we could have equivalent
results using the standard definitions.
An important issue is that we quantify the security against a cheating Bob as the
probability that he can guess (x0, x1). One can imagine a security definition where Bob’s
guessing probability is not for (x0, x1), but for example for x0 ⊕ x1 or any other function
f(x0, x1). Since we are mostly interested in lower bounds, we believe our definition is the most
appropriate one, since a lower bound on the probability of guessing (x0, x1) automatically
yields a lower bound on the probability of guessing any f(x0, x1).
Note also that we do not have composability requirements for such protocols. Our main
goal here is to get a constant lower bound for the simplest definition of OT, hence making
the result as strong as possible. This is why we use the stand-alone definition. This is also
the definition that one can relate most easily to the coin flipping protocols, which are also
defined in a stand-alone way, e.g., in Kitaev’s bound.
We also define quantum (strong) coin flipping.
I Definition 6. A quantum coin flipping protocol with bias ε, denoted here as CF , is a
protocol between Alice and Bob who agree on an output a ∈ {0, 1,Abort} such that:
If Alice and Bob are honest then Pr[a = 0] = Pr[a = 1] = 12
ACF := sup{max{Pr[a = 0],Pr[a = 1]}} = 12 + εA
BCF := sup{max{Pr[a = 0],Pr[a = 1]}} = 12 + εB
The bias of the protocol is defined as ε := max{εA, εB}
where the suprema are taken over all strategies for Alice and Bob.
3 A Lower Bound on Any Oblivious Transfer Protocol
In this section we prove that the bias of any random-OT protocol, and hence any OT
protocol, is bounded below by a constant. We start from a random-OT protocol and first
show how to construct a coin flipping protocol. Then, we prove a relation between the
cheating probabilities of the coin flipping protocol and those in the random-OT protocol.
Last, we use Kitaev’s lower bound for coin flipping to derive a lower bound for any OT
protocol.
3.1 From Oblivious Transfer to Coin Flipping
Coin Flipping Protocol via random-OT
1. Alice and Bob perform the OT protocol to create (x0, x1) and (b, xb) respectively.
If the OT protocol is aborted then so is the coin flipping protocol.
2. Alice sends c ∈R {0, 1} to Bob.
3. Bob sends b and xb to Alice.
4. If xb from Bob is consistent with Alice’s bits then the output of the protocol is c⊕ b.
Otherwise Alice aborts.
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By definition, AOT and BOT denote the optimal cheating probabilities for Alice and Bob
in the random-OT protocol and ACF and BCF denote the optimal cheating probabilities for
Alice and Bob in the coin flipping protocol. Kitaev’s lower bound on coin flipping implies
that ACFBCF ≥ 1/2. We use this inequality to derive an inequality involving AOT and BOT .
I Theorem 1. In any quantum oblivious transfer protocol, we have
AOT · f(BOT ) ≥ 1/2
for the function f defined as2
f(z) = 16(3
√
3
√
27z2 − 2z + 27z − 1)1/3 + 16(3
√
3
√
27z2 − 2z + 27z − 1)−1/3 + 1/3.
This implies that the bias ε of the protocol satisfies
ε ≥ 12
(√
1
2 + 2
√
2−
√
1
2
)
− 12 ≈ 0.0586.
In what follows we prove the above theorem.
Let ¬⊥CFA (resp. ¬⊥CFB ) denote the event “Alice (resp. Bob) does not abort during the
entire coin flipping protocol”. Let ¬⊥OTA (resp. ¬⊥OTB ) denote the event “Alice (resp. Bob)
does not abort during the random-OT subroutine”.
Cheating Alice
By definition, AOT is the optimal probability of Alice guessing b in the random-OT protocol
without Bob aborting. Suppose Alice desires to force 0 in the coin flipping protocol (a similar
argument can be made if she wants 1). Bob must not abort and Alice must send c = b in her
last message. Notice also that in our coin flipping protocol, honest Bob only aborts in the
OT subroutine and hence ¬⊥OTB ≡ ¬⊥CFB . Thus,
ACF = sup{Pr[ (Alice sends c = b)∧¬⊥CFB ]} = sup{Pr[ (Alice guesses b)∧¬⊥OTB ]} = AOT .
where the suprema are taken over all possible strategies for Alice.
Cheating Bob
By definition, BOT is the optimal probability of Bob learning both bits in the random-OT
protocol without Alice aborting. Thus,
BOT = sup{Pr[ (Bob guesses (x0, x1)) ∧ ¬⊥OTA ]}
= sup{Pr[¬⊥OTA ] · Pr[ (Bob guesses (x0, x1))|¬⊥OTA ]}.
where the suprema are taken over all strategies for Bob.
If Bob wants to force 0 in the coin flipping protocol (a similar argument works if he wants
to force 1), then first, Alice must not abort in the random-OT protocol and second, Bob
must send b = c as well as the correct xc such that Alice does not abort in the last round of
the coin flipping protocol. This is equivalent to saying that Bob succeeds if he guesses xc
and Alice does not abort in the random-OT protocol. Since c is chosen by Alice uniformly
at random, we can write the probability of Bob cheating as
2 f is the inverse function of g(x) = x(2x− 1)2 on some domain, see the proof for more details.
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BCF = max
{
1
2 Pr[(Bob guesses x0) ∧ ¬⊥
OT
A ] +
1
2 Pr[(Bob guesses x1) ∧ ¬⊥
OT
A ]
}
= max
{
Pr[¬⊥OTA ] ·
(
1
2 Pr[(Bob guesses x0)|¬⊥
OT
A ] +
1
2 Pr[(Bob guesses x1)|¬⊥
OT
A ]
)}
.
Notice that we use “max” instead of “sup” above. This is because an optimal strategy
exists for every coin flipping protocol. This is a consequence of strong duality in the
semidefinite programming formalism of [Kit03], see [ABDR04] for details.
Let us now fix Bob’s optimal cheating strategy in the CF protocol. For this strategy, let
p = Pr[(Bob guesses x0)|¬⊥OTA ], q = Pr[(Bob guesses x1)|¬⊥OTA ] and a = p+q2 . Note that
wlog, we can assume that Bob’s measurements are projective measurements. This can be
done by increasing the dimension of Bob’s space. Also, Alice has a projective measurement
on her space to determine the bits (x0, x1).
We use the following lemma to relate BCF and BOT .
I Lemma 1 (Learning-In-Sequence Lemma). Let p, q ∈ [1/2, 1]. Let Alice and Bob share a
joint pure state. Suppose Alice performs a projective measurement M = {Mx0,x1}x0,x1∈{0,1}
on her space to determine the values of (x0, x1). Suppose there is a projective measurement
P = {P0, P1} on Bob’s space that allows him to guess bit x0 with probability p and a projective
measurement Q = {Q0, Q1} on his space that allows him to guess bit x1 with probability
q. Then, there exists a measurement on Bob’s space that allows him to guess (x0, x1) with
probability at least a(2a− 1)2 where a = p+q2 .
We postpone the proof of this lemma to Subsection 3.2.
We now construct a cheating strategy for Bob for the OT protocol: run the optimal
cheating CF strategy and look at Bob’s state after step 1 conditioned on ¬⊥OTA . Note
that this event happens with nonzero probability in the optimal coin flipping strategy
since otherwise the success probability is 0. The optimal CF strategy gives measurements
that allow Bob to guess x0 with probability p and x1 with probability q. Bob uses these
measurements and the procedure of Lemma 1 to guess (x0, x1). Let b be the probability he
guesses (x0, x1). From Lemma 1, we have that b ≥ a(2a − 1)2. By definition of BOT and
BCF , we have:
b = Pr[ (Bob guesses (x0, x1))|¬⊥OTA ] ≤
BOT
Pr[¬⊥OTA ]
and a = BCF
Pr[¬⊥OTA ]
.
This gives us
BOT
Pr[¬⊥OTA ]
≥ BCF
Pr[¬⊥OTA ]
(
2 BCF
Pr[¬⊥OTA ]
− 1
)2
=⇒ BOT ≥ BCF (2BCF − 1)2 ,
where the implication holds since BCF ≥ 1/2.
We now calculate an upper bound on BCF as a function of BOT . Let g(x) = x(2x− 1)2.
It can be easily checked that g is bijective on the interval [0.5, 1] and increasing. Let f be the
inverse function of g from [0, 1] to [0, 0.5]. Since g is increasing, f is also increasing. Hence,
since BOT ≥ g(BCF ) and BCF ∈ [0.5, 1], we conclude that
BCF ≤ f(BOT ).
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We can write f analytically using computer software to get the following function
f(z) = 16(3
√
3
√
27z2 − 2z + 27z − 1)1/3 + 16(3
√
3
√
27z2 − 2z + 27z − 1)−1/3 + 1/3.
Kitaev’s lower bound states that ACFBCF ≥ 1/2. From this, we have
AOT f(BOT ) ≥ ACFBCF ≥ 1/2.
We now proceed to give the lower bound for the bias. Since f is increasing, we have
(ε+ 1/2) · f(ε+ 1/2) ≥ AOT f(BOT ) ≥ ACFBCF ≥ 1/2.
Solving the inequality we show that ε must satisfy
ε ≥ 12
(√
1
2 + 2
√
2−
√
1
2
)
− 12 ≈ 0.0586.
3.2 Proof of the Learning-In-Sequence Lemma
The Learning-in-Sequence Lemma follows from the following simple geometric result.
I Proposition 2. Let |ψ〉 be a pure state and let {C, I−C} and {D, I−D} be two projective
measurements such that
cos2(θ) := ‖C|ψ〉‖22 ≥
1
2 and cos
2(θ′) := ‖D|ψ〉‖22 ≥
1
2 .
Then we have
‖DC|ψ〉‖22 ≥ cos2(θ) cos2(θ + θ′).
Proof. Define the following states
|X〉 := C|ψ〉‖C|ψ〉‖2
, |X ′〉 := (I − C)|ψ〉‖(I − C)|ψ〉‖2
, |Y 〉 := D|ψ〉‖D|ψ〉‖2
, |Y ′〉 := (I −D)|ψ〉‖(I −D)|ψ〉‖2
.
Then we can write |ψ〉 = cos(θ)|X〉+ eiα sin(θ)|X ′〉 and |ψ〉 = cos(θ′)|Y 〉+ eiβ sin(θ′)|Y ′〉
with α, β ∈ R. Then we have
‖DC|ψ〉‖22 = cos2(θ) ‖D|X〉‖22 ≥ cos2(θ)|〈Y |X〉|2 ≥ cos2(θ) cos2(θ + θ′).
J
We now prove Lemma 1.
Proof. Let |Ω〉AB be the joint pure state shared by Alice and Bob, where A is the space
controlled by Alice and B the space controlled by Bob.
Let M = {Mx0,x1}x0,x1∈{0,1} be Alice’s projective measurement on A to determine her
outputs x0, x1. Let P = {P0, P1} be Bob’s projective measurement that allows him to guess
x0 with probability p = cos2(θ) and Q = {Q0, Q1} be Bob’s projective measurement that
allows him to guess x1 with probability q = cos2(θ′). These measurements are on B only.
Recall that a = p+q2 =
cos2(θ)+cos2(θ′)
2 . We consider the following projections on AB:
C =
∑
x0,x1
Mx0,x1 ⊗ Px0 and D =
∑
x0,x1
Mx0,x1 ⊗Qx1 .
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C (resp. D) is the projection on the subspace where Bob guesses correctly the first bit
(resp. the second bit) after applying P (resp. Q).
A strategy for Bob to learn both bits is simple: apply the two measurements P and Q
one after the other, where the first one is chosen uniformly at random.
The projection on the subspace where Bob guesses (x0, x1) when applying P then Q is
E =
∑
x0,x1
Mx0,x1 ⊗Qx1Px0 = DC.
Similarly, the projection on the subspace where Bob guesses (x0, x1) when applying Q then
P is
F =
∑
x0,x1
Mx0,x1 ⊗ Px0Qx1 = CD.
With this strategy Bob can guess both bits with probability
1
2
(||E|Ω〉||22 + ||F |Ω〉||22) = 12 (||DC|Ω〉||22 + ||CD|Ω〉||22)
≥ 12
(
cos2(θ) + cos2(θ′)
)
cos2(θ + θ′)
≥ 12
(
cos2(θ) + cos2(θ′)
) (
cos2(θ) + cos2(θ′)− 1)2
= a(2a− 1)2.
Note that we can use Proposition 2 since Bob’s optimal measurement to guess x0 and x1
succeeds for each bit with probability at least 1/2. J
4 A Two-Message Protocol With Bias 1/4
We present in this section a random-OT protocol with bias 1/4. This implies, as we have
mentioned, an OT protocol with inputs with the same bias.
Random Oblivious Transfer Protocol
1. Bob chooses b ∈R {0, 1} and creates the state |φb〉 := 1√2 |bb〉+ 1√2 |22〉.
2. Alice chooses x0, x1 ∈R {0, 1} and applies the unitary |a〉 → (−1)xa |a〉,
where x2 := 0, to half of Bob’s state.
3. Alice returns the qutrit to Bob who now has the state |ψb〉 := (−1)
xb√
2 |bb〉+ 1√2 |22〉.
4. Bob performs on the state |ψb〉 the measurement {Π0 = |φb〉〈φb|,Π1 := |φ′b〉〈φ′b|,
I −Π0 −Π1}, where |φ′b〉 := 1√2 |bb〉 − 1√2 |22〉.
If the outcome is Π0 then xb = 0, if it is Π1 then xb = 1, otherwise he aborts.
It is clear that Bob can learn x0 or x1 perfectly. Moreover, note that if he sends half of
the state 1√2 |00〉+ 1√2 |11〉 then he can also learn x0 ⊕ x1 perfectly (although in this case he
does not learn either of x0 or x1). We now show that it is impossible for him to perfectly
learn both x0 and x1 and also that his bit is not completely revealed to a cheating Alice.
I Theorem 2. In the protocol described above, we have AOT = BOT = 34 .
André Chailloux, Iordanis Kerenidis, and Jamie Sikora 165
In the full version, we prove this theorem. In the previous section we have shown that no
protocol has bias lower than 0.0586 by showing that AOT f(BOT ) ≥ 1/2. In this section we
presented a protocol with bias 0.25 and it can be calculated that for this protocol we have
AOT f(BOT ) = 34 f
( 3
4
) ≈ 0.709. It remains an open problem to determine the bias of an
optimal protocol.
5 Oblivious Transfer as a Forcing Primitive
Here we discuss a variant of oblivious transfer, as a generalization of coin flipping, that can
be analyzed using an extension of Kitaev’s semidefinite programming formalism.
I Definition 3 (Forcing Oblivious Transfer). A k-out-of-n forcing oblivious transfer protocol,
denoted here as
(
n
k
)
-fOT, with forcing bias ε is a protocol satisfying:
Alice outputs n random bits x := (x1, . . . , xn)
Bob outputs a random index set b of k indices and bit string xb consisting of xi for i ∈ b
Ab,xb := sup{Pr[Alice can force Bob to output (b, xb)]} =
εA(
n
k
) · 2k
Bx := sup{Pr[Bob can force Alice to output x]} = εB2n
The forcing bias of the protocol is defined as ε = max{εA, εB}
where the suprema are taken over all strategies of Alice and Bob.
The main difference in this new primitive is the definition of security. We design protocols to
protect against a dishonest party being able to force a desired value as the output of the
other party. In the previous section (and in the literature) oblivious transfer protocols are
designed to protect against the dishonest party learning the other party’s output. Notice, for
example, that in coin flipping we can design protocols to protect against a dishonest party
forcing a desired outcome, but both players learn the coin outcome perfectly.
The primitive we have defined is indeed a generalization of coin flipping since we can cast
the problem of coin flipping as a 1-out-of-1 forcing oblivious transfer protocol. Of course, in(1
1
)
-fOT Alice always knows Bob’s index set so the forcing bias is the only interesting notion
of security in this case.
We define the bias ε as a multiplicative factor instead of additive since the honest
probabilities can be different and in this case our definition makes more sense. To relate this
bias to the one previously studied in coin flipping we have that coin flipping protocols with
bias ε ≤ √2 + δ exist for any δ > 0, see [CK09], and weak coin flipping protocols with bias
ε ≤ 1 + δ exist for any δ > 0, see [Moc07].
5.1 Extending Kitaev’s Lower Bound to Forcing Oblivious Transfer
We now extend Kitaev’s formalism from the setting of coin flipping to the more general
setting of
(
n
k
)
-fOT.
Suppose Alice and Bob have private spaces A and B, respectively, and both have access
to a message spaceM each initialized in state |0〉. Then, we can define an m-round (nk)-fOT
protocol using the following parameters:
Alice’s unitary operators UA,1, . . . , UA,m which act on A⊗M
Bob’s unitary operators UB,1, . . . , UB,m which act onM⊗B
Alice’s POVM {ΠA,abort} ∪ {ΠA,x : x ∈ Zn2} acting on A, one for each outcome
Bob’s POVM {ΠB,abort} ∪
{
ΠB,(b,xb) : b a k-element subset of n indices, xb ∈ Zk2
}
acting
on B, one for each outcome.
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We now show the criteria for which the parameters above yield a proper
(
n
k
)
-fOT protocol.
In a proper protocol we require that Alice and Bob’s measurements are consistent and that
the outcomes are uniformly random when the protocol is followed honestly. Define
|ψ〉 := (IA ⊗ UB,m)(UA,m ⊗ IB) · · · (IA ⊗ UB,1)(UA,1 ⊗ IB)|0〉A⊗M⊗B
to be the state at the end of an honest run of the protocol. Then, we require the unitary
and measurement operators to satisfy the following condition:∥∥(ΠA,x ⊗ IM ⊗ΠB,(b,xb))|ψ〉∥∥22 = 1(n
k
)
2n
for (x, b, xb) consistent.
Similar to coin flipping, we can capture cheating strategies as semidefinite programs. Bob
can force Alice to output a specific x ∈ Zn2 with maximum probability equal to the optimal
value of the following semidefinite program
Bx = max 〈ΠA,x ⊗ IM, ρA,N 〉
subject to TrM(ρA,0) = |0〉〈0|A
TrM(ρA,j) = TrM(UA,jρA,j−1U∗A,j), for j ∈ {1, . . . , N}
ρA,0, . . . , ρA,N ∈ Pos(A⊗M), for j ∈ {0, . . . , N}
where Pos(H) is the set of positive semidefinite matrices over the Hilbert space H. The
states ρi represent the part of the state under Alice’s control after Bob sends his i’th message.
The constraints above are necessary since Bob cannot apply a unitary on A. They are also
sufficient since Bob can maintain a purification during the protocol consistent with the states
above to achieve a cheating probability given by the corresponding objective value.
To capture Alice’s cheating strategies we can do the same as for cheating Bob and examine
the states under Bob’s control during the course of the protocol. That is, Alice can force
Bob to output a specific k-element subset b and xb ∈ Zk2 with maximum probability equal to
the optimal value of the following semidefinite program
Ab,xb = max 〈IM ⊗ΠB,(b,xb), ρB,N 〉
subject to TrM(ρB,0) = |0〉〈0|B
TrM(ρB,j) = TrM(UB,jρB,j−1U∗B,j), for j ∈ {1, . . . , N}
ρB,0, . . . , ρB,N ∈ Pos(M⊗B), for j ∈ {0, . . . , N}
The proofs that these capture the optimal cheating probabilities are the same as those
for coin flipping in [Kit03] and [ABDR04]. Using these semidefinite programs we can prove
the following theorem.
I Theorem 3. In any
(
n
k
)
-fOT protocol and consistent b, x, xb we have
Bx ·Ab,xb ≥ Pr[Alice honestly outputs x and Bob honestly outputs (b, xb)] =
1(
n
k
)
2n
.
In particular, the forcing bias satisfies ε ≥ √2k.
Once we extended the semidefinite programming formulation, the proof of the theorem
follows almost directly from the proof in [Kit03] and [ABDR04] for coin flipping except that
the honest outcome probabilities are different in our case. Namely, for |ψ〉 defined above, we
have∥∥(ΠA,x ⊗ IM ⊗ΠB,(b,xb))|ψ〉∥∥22 = 1(n
k
)
2n
when x, b, and xb are consistent and 0 otherwise.
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5.2 A Protocol with Optimal Forcing Bias
In this section we prove Theorem 4. First, consider the following protocol which achieves
the bound in Theorem 3 but is asymmetric. Alice sends n random bits to Bob. Bob then
outputs b, a random k-index subset of n indices, and xb. In this protocol Bob can force a
desired outcome with probability 12n and Alice can force a desired outcome with probability
1
(nk)
. Thus the product of the cheating probabilities is optimal, that is it achieves the lower
bound in Theorem 3. However the protocol is asymmetric. This can be easily remedied using
coin flipping. We present an optimal protocol with this security definition.
An Optimal
(
n
k
)
-fOT Protocol with Forcing Bias
√
2k
1. Bob outputs a random index set b of k indices and sends the result to Alice.
2. Alice and Bob play a coin flipping game with bias
√
2 + δ
(for a δ > 0 sufficiently small) to determine each bit in xb.
3. Alice randomly chooses her bits not in b.
I Theorem 4. For any γ > 0 we can choose a δ > 0 such that the
(
n
k
)
-fOT protocol above
satisfies
Ab,xb ≤
√
2k(1 + γ)(
n
k
) · 2k and Bx ≤
√
2k(1 + γ)
2n .
We prove this theorem in the final version. Note that we have coin flipping protocols with
poly(m) rounds that achieve δ = 1poly(m) . Hence, our protocol also achieves γ =
1
poly(m) with
poly(m) rounds.
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